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gram, WSummary. — In an attempt to go beyond the so called ‘‘smart” subsidies, Nigeria has embarked on a potentially innovative mobile
phone-based input subsidy program that provides fertilizer and improved seed subsidies through electronic vouchers. In this article,
we examined the productivity and welfare eﬀects of the program using household-level data from rural Nigeria. The article employed
instrumental variable regression approach to control for the potential endogeneity of the input subsidy program. Our results suggest
that the program is eﬀective in improving productivity and welfare outcomes of beneﬁciary smallholders. The size of the estimated eﬀects
suggests a large improvement in productivity and welfare outcomes. Moreover, the distributional eﬀects of the program suggest no
heterogeneity eﬀects based on gender and farm land size. These results are robust to using alternative measurements of program partic-
ipation. The beneﬁt–cost ratio of 1.11 suggests that the program is marginally cost-eﬀective. Overall, our results suggest that while
improving average productivity is a good outcome for improving food security, improving the distributional outcome of the program
by targeting the most disadvantaged groups would maximize the program’s contribution to food security and poverty reduction.
 2017TheAuthors. Published byElsevierLtd.This is an open access article under the CCBY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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It is widely recognized that modern agricultural technologies
are critical for improving smallholder agricultural productiv-
ity. In an eﬀort to promote adoption of yield-increasing tech-
nologies such as inorganic fertilizer and improved seed, many
sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries implemented universal
large-scale input subsidy programs throughout the 1970s and
1980s (Jayne, Mather, Mason, & Ricker-Gilbert, 2013; Jayne
& Rashid, 2013; Mason & Ricker-Gilbert, 2013). However,
with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program
(SAP) in the 1980s and 1990s, such universal subsidies were
greatly reduced across the region. In particular, as part of
the SAP, the World Bank (WB) advised countries in SSA to
phase out input subsidies on the premise that the private sector
can provide it more eﬃciently through market-based mecha-
nisms (Ricker-Gilbert, 2014; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, &
Chirwa, 2011). However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
large-scale targeted input subsidies have been re-introduced
as a replacement of the old universal input subsidy programs
(Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Jayne et al., 2013; Liverpool-Tasie &
Takeshima, 2013; Lunduka, Fisher, & Snapp, 2012; Ricker-
Gilbert, Jayne, & Shively, 2013). 1
Like many SSA governments, Nigeria has since then imple-
mented a large-scale targeted input subsidy program called the
Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GES) in 2012. The
program was implemented with the broad oﬃcial objective
of promoting agricultural productivity and food security by
making fertilizer and improved seed more aﬀordable and
accessible to smallholders (Liverpool-Tasie, 2013; Liverpool-
Tasie & Takeshima, 2013). The GES targets only fulltime
and non-commercial farmers. In addition, it involves private1
cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
orld Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2agro-dealers in the procurement and distribution of subsidized
fertilizer and improved seeds. In an attempt to go beyond the
so called ‘‘smart” subsidies, the GES attempts to provide a
50% subsidy on two 50-kg bags of fertilizer (NPK and urea)
and a 90% subsidy on a 50-kg bag of improved seeds (mostly
maize and rice seeds) through e-vouchers. 2 The e-voucher that
the farmers receive via their mobile phone entitles them to buy
fertilizer and improved seed from local agro-dealers at a sub-
sidized price. The e-voucher further speciﬁes the total quantity
of fertilizer and improved seed allocated to the farmer as well
as the designated redemption center for collection.
Since the GES program outsources the subsidy to private
agro-dealers, it is safe to assume that the scheme will have a
crowding-in eﬀect on the supply side of fertilizer and improved
seed markets in terms of private sector sales. However, farmers
could still use subsidized inputs provided through the GES in
place of some or all of their commercial purchases, leading to
crowding out of commercial inputs on the demand side of the
market. Regardless, there is little empirical evidence on the
impact of the program to inform on-going debates on how
eﬀectively the GES program increases agricultural productiv-
ity and welfare of poor and food insecure households. In this
study, we empirically test whether a mobile-based e-voucherWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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improves productivity and welfare outcomes. Maize yield
and income from maize production are used as a proxy for
productivity outcomes in this article, while per-capita food,
total, and non-food expenditure are used as indicators for wel-
fare outcomes. We focus on productivity and welfare out-
comes as they are the most important indicators given the
stated objectives of the GES.
This article contributes to the literature on input subsidies in
the following ways: First, by focusing on a country that imple-
mented the most expensive input subsidy program in SSA, it
investigates the enduring question of whether and to what
extent a smart input subsidy program such as the GES impacts
productivity and welfare outcomes. To date, there is not a sin-
gle study that evaluated the impact of the GES program on
productivity and welfare of smallholders in Nigeria. In addi-
tion, this article is the ﬁrst to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of an
e-voucher input subsidy program. Second, in an attempt to
provide beyond average treatment eﬀects, we examine the dis-
tributional impacts of the GES program focusing on two
sources of heterogeneity: gender and farm land size. In princi-
ple, the GES should, ceteris paribus, only improve the income
of smallholders. However, leakages and imperfect targeting
may divert subsidies away from the intended beneﬁciaries.
Under such circumstances, the GES may become beneﬁcial
on average by improving the productivity of commercial farm-
ers albeit ineﬀective in addressing the needs of smallholders.
This paper therefore addresses this issue by estimating the
overall average eﬀect of the program as well as its distribu-
tional eﬀects. In estimating the overall average and distribu-
tional impacts of the GES program, we control for the
potential endogeneity of participation in the GES using
Instrumental Variable (IV) regression approach. We also
examined the robustness of estimated impacts by constructing
alternative measures of participation in the GES program.
Finally, in an attempt to provide an overall eﬀectiveness of
the program, the paper undertakes a beneﬁt–cost analysis
based on observed direct costs and beneﬁts. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the GES program. Data sources and the econometric strat-
egy are presented in Section 3. Section 4 reports the ﬁndings
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes and provides a
list of open questions and discusses areas of further research.2. OVERVIEW OF THE GROWTH ENHANCEMENT
SUPPORT SCHEME (GES) IN NIGERIA
Although the vast majority of Nigeria’s rural population
engages in agriculture, the sector has been in the periphery
of government priorities over the past 30 years. As a result,
the rate of rural poverty and food insecurity has increased sub-
stantially over that time period. For instance, rural poverty
measured at the food poverty line has increased from 33.6%
in 2004 to 48.3% in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics
Nigeria (NBSN), 2010). Moreover, the country’s status has
changed from a food exporter to one of the world’s largest
food importers, spending more than $11 billion annually
(Adesina, 2012). In a stated eﬀort to reduce this trend, the
Nigerian government has embarked on the GES program in
2012. Increasing the use of improved seeds and fertilizer
through ‘‘smart” subsidy schemes was seen as an essential
intervention area. This policy decision was perhaps surprising
because fertilizer subsidies have been in place in Nigeria in one
form or another since the 1970s (Liverpool-Tasie, 2013;
Liverpool-Tasie & Takeshima, 2013) and have accounted forPlease cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
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(Takeshima, Nkonya, & Deb, 2013). 3 However, the old fertil-
izer subsidy program was deemed to be ineﬃcient with wide-
spread corruption and smuggling to neighboring countries
(Olomola, 2015). Moreover, it was heavily criticized as pro-
curement and distribution of subsidized fertilizer were mainly
managed by the government with limited private sector
involvement (Liverpool-Tasie & Takeshima, 2013).
The GES has been implemented with the intention to
improve the eﬃciency of fertilizer and improved seed distribu-
tion to smallholders. By deregulating seed and fertilizer mar-
kets as well as through well-targeted fertilizer and improved
seed subsidies, the GES aims to increase the productivity of
smallholders. It was speciﬁcally designed to minimize leakages
and to ensure that subsidies are provided only to intended
farmers. In addition, the procurement and distribution of fer-
tilizer and improved seeds is outsourced to private agro-
dealers. The GES intends to provide improved seed and fertil-
izer to 20 million farmers within ﬁve years (Federal Ministry
of Agricultural & Rural Development (FMARD), 2011). In
addition, the scheme aims at increasing fertilizer use from
the current level of approximately 13 kg/ha to 50 kg/ha
(FMARD, 2011; Olomola, 2015).
In principle, the GES targets only fulltime and non-
commercial farmers. However, there is no database of farmers
to verify eligibility and most of the demographic information
provided by farmers was self-reported. Registration of eligible
farmers was carried out manually, with completion of forms at
village level with the help of village leaders (GrowAfrica (GA),
2014; Olomola, 2015). In order to make the subsidy ‘‘smarter”,
the initial list compiled at the village level was transferred to
an electronic database. Moreover, each farmer was given a
unique identiﬁer with the help of National Identity Manage-
ment Commission (NIMC). After registration was completed,
eligible farmers received an e-wallet (an electronic voucher)
notiﬁcation through their phone. The e-wallet speciﬁes the
total quantity of fertilizer and improved seed allocated to
the farmer as well as the designated redemption center for col-
lection. According to FMARD (2011), the national electronic
database of farmers registered to the GES was used to send
out mobile alerts. While all registered farmers were supposed
to receive a mobile alert, results from our survey suggests that
some farmers have not received mobile alerts despite being
registered for the GES.3. DATA SOURCES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
(a) Data sources
This study uses a household survey data collected by the
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in
2015 as part of an on-going eﬀort to evaluate the impact of
adoption of drought tolerant maize varieties and the GES
on productivity and welfare outcomes. A multi-stage-
stratiﬁed sampling procedure was employed to select Enumer-
ation Areas (EAs) from each Local Government Areas
(LGAs), and households from each of the selected EAs. The
list of all EAs was obtained from the National Population
Commission (NPC) of Nigeria. The EAs were then divided
by the number of LGAs in each of the selected states to obtain
the number of EAs per LGA. Following the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS) recommendation for a nationally represen-
tative data collection, 10% of the LGAs in each of the selected
States and 5% of the total EAs per LGA were randomly
selected. Finally, from the households in each of the selectedWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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ing in a sample size of 2,305 households.
The data were collected using structured questionnaire
which was pre-tested twice by trained and experienced enu-
merators. The survey questionnaire was designed to gather
detailed information on socio-economic characteristics of
households, expenditure on food, and non-food items, input
use and allocation, crop and livestock production, output
for maize, and other notable crops and participation in the
GES program. In addition, extensive village-level data were
collected on the incidence of shocks, prices of key inputs
and crops, among others. In terms of participation in the
GES, relevant data were collected on the level of awareness
about the GES program as well as on farmers’ decision to reg-
ister for the GES program. In addition, data were collected on
the quantity of seed and fertilizer allocated to registered farm-
ers as well as the ﬁnal quantity collected and the price paid by
the participants of the GES program. To minimize errors
usually encountered with the use of paper questionnaire,
the data for this study were collected electronically using the
‘‘surveybe” software.
(b) Empirical strategy
Like any evaluation program, establishing the causal
impacts of an input subsidy program on various outcomes
of interest is in fact a ‘‘wicked problem” (Ricker-Gilbert,
Jayne et al., 2013). First, subsidies are rarely distributed ran-
domly across villages and among farmers. As such, identifying
the causal eﬀects of an input subsidy program requires con-
trolling for selection bias/endogeneity stemming from observ-
able and unobservable factors. In non-experimental data,
common approaches for identifying causal impacts include
diﬀerent matching techniques, ﬁxed eﬀects (when panel data
is available), and instrumental variable (IV) regression. In this
paper, we employed an inverse probability-weighted adjusted
regression (IPWRA) and IV regression approach due to the
cross-sectional nature of our data.
One challenge with using propensity score matching is that
the estimates produce biased results in the presence of misspec-
iﬁcation in the propensity score model (Robins, Sued, Lei-
Gomez, & Rotnitzky, 2007; Wooldridge, 2007; Wooldridge,
2010). For this reason, we used the IPWRA estimator which
combines regression and propensity score methods in order to
achieve some robustness to misspeciﬁcation of the parametric
models (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Robins & Rotnitzky,
1995; Wooldridge, 2010). In particular, IPWRA model esti-
mates the outcome and treatment models as follows: Suppose
that the outcome model is represented by a liner regression
function of the form Y i ¼ ai þ hixi þ ei for i ¼ ½0 1 where Y i is
the outcome variable of interest; xi a set of controls; a and h
are parameters to be estimated; e is the error term. Further, sup-
pose that the propensity scores are given by pðx;#Þ. In the ﬁrst
step, we estimate the propensity scores as p x; #^
 
. In the second
step, we employ linear regression to estimate a0; h0ð Þ and a1; h1ð Þ
using inverse probability-weighted least squares as follows:
min
a0 ;h0
XN
i
ðY i  a0  h0xiÞ=p x; #^
 
if I i ¼ 0 ð1Þ
min
a1 ;h1
XN
i
ðY i  a1  h1xiÞ=p x; #^
 
if I i ¼ 1 ð2Þ
The average treatment eﬀect (ATT) is then computed as the
diﬀerence between Eqns. (1) and (2).Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
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Nw
XNw
i
½ a^1  a^0ð Þ  ðh^1  h^0Þxi ð3Þ
where (a^1) are estimated inverse probability-weighted parame-
ters for households that participated in the GES while (a^0) are
estimated inverse probability-weighted parameters for non-
participants. Finally, Nw stands for the total number of GES
participants. I i is an indicator which takes a value of one if
the household participates in the GES program and zero
otherwise.
However, casual identiﬁcation requires controlling for both
observable and unobservable factors that inﬂuence participa-
tion in the GES and productivity and welfare outcomes.
Hence, estimates of Eq. (3) may yield biased estimates due
to biases stemming from unobservable factors. Therefore, we
employed an IV regression approach to control for the poten-
tial endogeneity of participation in the GES. As mentioned
above, there are several reasons for participation in the GES
to be endogenous. First, households that are either more or
less productive than the average smallholder may choose to
register for GES. Hence, it is likely that participation in the
GES is correlated with poverty status, household income, or
underlying features that inﬂuence these outcome variables
(Chibwana, Fisher, & Shively, 2012; Ricker-Gilbert, Mason,
Darko, & Tembo, 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011; Shively,
Chibwana, Fisher, Jumbe, & Masters, 2012). Second, there
is a possibility that farmers who participated in the GES share
common intrinsic characteristics, such as poor/better farming
skills and management abilities, which are likely to be related
to poverty status and household income. As a result, we
employed an IV regression approach.
However, ﬁnding an instrument that satisﬁes the orthogo-
nality condition is not a trivial matter. Most of the studies that
evaluated the impacts of input subsidies on such outcome indi-
cators have used the variable ‘‘number of years the household
head has lived in a village” as an instrument (Chibwana et al.,
2011; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011; Shively et al., 2012). Follow-
ing the literature, we used the number of years the household
head has lived in a village as a potential instrument for partic-
ipation in the GES. The number of years that the household
head has lived in the village is a measure of socio-political cap-
ital that could inﬂuence farmer’s participation in the GES
(Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). We assume that this variable
has no direct eﬀect on productivity and welfare outcomes
except through its eﬀect on farmers’ decisions to participate
in the GES. 4
As explained in Section 2, participation in the GES involves
a sequence of steps and choices. In our setup this process
involves: becoming aware of the GES program, registering
for the GES program, receiving a mobile alert and collecting
subsidized fertilizer and improved seeds from redemption cen-
ters. Registration is a strict subset of awareness, and receiving
a mobile alert is a strict subset of registration in the GES.
However, collection of subsidized fertilizer and improved
seeds is not a strict subset of receiving a mobile alert (it is a
strict subset of registration). In order to capture the above
sequential process, we employed the following sequential pro-
bit model.
Pr Ik;i ¼ 1jX i; Si; V i; Zi; Ik1;i ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ p^ik ð4Þ
where p^ik is the standard probit model represented by:
p^ik ¼ UðX i; Si; V i; Zi; bÞ. Herein, U represents the cumulative
distribution function and b captures vectors of parameters
to be estimated. Ik is an indicator function that takes a value
of one if farmer i passes transition k (becoming aware of theWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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and zero otherwise. X i captures a vector of household i’s char-
acteristics such as household size, age, education that aﬀect
participation in the GES. Si captures participation in social
network activities such as membership in cooperatives and
labor-sharing arrangements (Wossen, Berger, & Di Falco,
2015) while V i captures state-level ﬁxed eﬀects to control
state-level heterogeneity in the implementation of the GES
program. The variable Zi is our instrument: the number of
years the household head has resided in the village. According
to FMARD (2011), all registered farmers will receive mobile
alerts. As such, the selection bias occurs at the awareness
and registration stage. We assume that those farmers who
have lived in the village for long time are more likely to be
aware of the GES program as they have more connections.
Similarly, they are also more likely to be recognized by village
leaders and hence can be considered as genuine farmers at the
time of registration, which increases the likelihood of partici-
pating in the GES.
The outcome equation estimates the eﬀect of participation in
the GES program on productivity and welfare indicators.
Formally, the empirical speciﬁcation is presented as follows:
Y ij ¼ a0 þ sI ij þ bX ij þ cSij þ #V ij þ eij: ð5Þ
In the above equation, the predicted probability of partici-
pation from the ﬁrst stage probit model is used as instrument
for I ij (participation in the GES). This method is eﬃcient even
with weak instruments and it is preferred to other IV methods
since our treatment variable is binary (Wooldridge, 2007).
(c) Outcome indicators
The outcome indicators are related to productivity and wel-
fare. Our ﬁrst productivity outcome-related indicator is maize
yield. Although the GES does not require participating farm-
ers to use the subsidized inputs on a particular crop, we opt to
consider maize yield as a productivity outcome variable as
maize is one of the most important food crops in Nigeria. In
fact, Nigeria is the largest maize producer in West Africa. In
addition, maize also stands to beneﬁt the most from fertilizer
subsidies as response rate of improved maize is higher than
most other crops. According to our data, average maize yield
in the study area stands at 2,006 kg/ha. However, average
maize yield for GES participants (2,205 kg/ha) is signiﬁcantly
higher than for non-participants (1,860 kg/ha) and the diﬀer-
ence is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% signiﬁcance level (see
Table 1). Our second productivity-related indicator is mea-
sured by income from maize production. 5 Looking into the
distribution of income from maize production, income
received from maize sales is higher for GES participants
(Table 1). However, these diﬀerences in maize yield and
income cannot simply be attributed to the GES by looking
at the mean diﬀerences between GES participants and non-
participants. In particular, these mean diﬀerences are only
indicative of correlations and cannot be used to make causal
inferences regarding the impacts of the GES on maize yields
and income without controlling for other confounding factors.
Our welfare-related indicators include food expenditure,
non-food expenditure, and total expenditure, all measured
on per-capita basis. In addition to expenditure indicators, we
also used headcount poverty ratio as an additional welfare
indicator. Total expenditure is calculated by summing food
and non-food expenditure values. A household’s food con-
sumption expenditure is comprised of monetary expenditures
on purchased food and the imputed values of consumption
from own harvest. Looking into the distribution ofPlease cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2consumption expenditures, the average per capita total con-
sumption expenditure is about ₦112,136 per year. 6 Like pro-
ductivity indicators, we found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in per-
capita food, non-food, and total consumption expenditures
between participants and non-participants of the GES (see
Table 1). However, as mentioned above, these diﬀerences
between participants and non-participants cannot be attribu-
ted to the GES. Our ﬁnal welfare related outcome indicator
measures the proportion of households below the poverty line,
commonly referred as the headcount ratio. Following Foster,
Greer, and Thorbecke (1984), per-capita total expenditure is
used to determine households’ poverty status. Formally, head-
count ratio (P 0) is calculated as:
P 0 ¼ 1N
XN
i¼1
IðXp < zÞ: ð6Þ
where Xp is per-capita total expenditure and N is the relevant
population size. z is a scalar set at per capita total expenditure
level of ₦91,250 per year per capita (NBSN, 2010). 7 Ið:Þ is an
indicator function which takes on a value of 1 when Xp < z
and a value of zero when Xp  z.
(b) Descriptive statistics
In the household survey, we collected detailed information
regarding the awareness and registration process of the
GES. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrst we asked households if they were
aware of the GES program. Second, we asked those who
responded in the aﬃrmative if they had registered in the
GES program. Third, we asked those who responded to the
registration question in the aﬃrmative if they had received
mobile alert. Finally, we asked those who were notiﬁed of
the e-voucher through the mobile alert if they had actually col-
lected the subsidized inputs and the quantity of seed and fer-
tilizer allocated to them as well as the ﬁnal quantity they
collected. We used the above sequence of questions to con-
struct dummy variables for our sequential probit model.
According to the survey, about 65.5% of the households were
aware of the GES program and only 64% of them registered
for the GES. However, our survey further revealed that only
76% of the registered households actually received mobile
alerts.
Since our main objective is to evaluate the overall eﬀective-
ness of the GES program on productivity and welfare out-
comes, we used registration to the GES program as our
main treatment variable. In particular, participation in the
GES is measured by a dummy variable which takes a value
of one if the household is registered to the GES and zero
otherwise. Note that, in the robustness section, we used receiv-
ing a mobile alert as well as actual collection of subsidized fer-
tilizer and improved seed as our treatment variables. Table 1
presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables of inter-
est based on the registration status of households. We included
household characteristics such as age, household size, educa-
tion, membership in diﬀerent social groups, risk-aversion,
self-reported weather, and stress shocks as well as wealth indi-
cators such as TLU and land size. In addition, we have
included access to climate and improved seed information as
these variables aﬀect awareness and registration decision to
the GES. We assume that the above key household character-
istics aﬀect farmers’ ability to participate in the GES. For
instance, we hypothesize that the education level of the house-
hold head aﬀects the likelihood of participation in the GES
positively. However, for most of our controls, the direction
of expected impacts cannot be determined a priori. TheWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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try new agricultural practices such as improved seed. In partic-
ular, data were collected on how willing the farmers are to take
risks related to new improved maize varieties. We consider
farmers as risk-averse if they are unwilling to ever try new
improved varieties. However, given the proxy nature of our
measurement, its eﬀect should be interpreted with caution.
In addition to household characteristics, we also included
state dummies to control for state-level ﬁxed eﬀects. We fur-
ther have controls for general conditions such as access to elec-
tricity. Finally, the number of years of residence in the village
serves as an instrument for participation in the GES. Table 1
further presents the diﬀerence in means between participant
and non-participant based on registration to the GES. As
shown in Table 1, the average household size is about 7.5
members for the whole sample. While comparing household
size between GES participants (7.9 members) and non-
participants (7.3 members), we found signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the two groups. Moreover, most of the respondents
are literate, the average literacy rate being 84%. The average
age of the household head is 47 years. About 90% of the
household heads are male and married. In our sample about
30% have access to oﬀ-farm employment opportunities. In
terms of self-reported shocks, about 67% and 19% of the
respondents have experienced stress and drought shocks,
respectively. On average, GES participants have better access
to oﬀ-farm employment, climate and varietal information, and
housing condition and tend to be older. Moreover, GES par-
ticipants reported higher incidence of stress and drought shock
compared to non-participants. We also found signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the two groups in terms of the number of
years the household head has resided in the village.Table 1. Descriptive statist
Full sample
(N = 1,919
Maize yield (kg/ha) 2,006
Income from maize production (₦) 77,517
Per capita total expenditure (₦) 112,136
Per capita food expenditure (₦) 53,890
Per capita non-food expenditure (₦) 58,246
Household size 7.55
Mobile phone ownership 0.93
Education (1 = literate, 0 = otherwise) 0.84
Marital status (1 = married, 0 = otherwise) 0.90
Age of the household head 47.3
Gender of the household head (1 = Female, 0 = otherwise) 0.105
Access to oﬀ-farm work (1 = has access, 0 = otherwise) 0.30
Rooﬁng material of the house (1 = has a sheet) 0.88
Farm size (ha) 4.47
Stress shock (1 = experience stress shock, 0 = otherwise) 0.66
Drought shock(1 = experience drought, 0 = otherwise) 0.19
Membership to credit and saving groups (1 = yes, 0 = No) 0.078
Membership to labor-sharing groups (1 = yes, 0 = No) 0.036
Membership to cooperatives (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 0.10
Membership to farmer research group (1 = yes, 0 = No) 0.15
Access to varietal information (1 = yes, 0 = No) 0.17
Access to climate information (1 = yes, 0 = No) 0.58
Risk aversion (1 = willing to try new things, 0 = otherwise) 0.74
Number of years residence in the village (years) 38.8
Access to electricity (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 0.48
aOur ﬁnal sample includes 1,919 households due to missing values for expend
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In this section, we present the results of our econometric
analysis. Firstly, we report the eﬀect of the GES program on
productivity, maize income, and welfare outcomes using
matching techniques in Table 2. We then proceed to present
eﬀects estimated using the IV regression approach in Table 5
for productivity and maize income and in Table 6 for welfare
indicators. In addition to average treatment eﬀects, in Tables 5
and 6 we present distributional eﬀects of the program esti-
mated based on interaction eﬀects. We present results for
alternative measure of participation in the GES program in
Tables 7 and 8 and placebo eﬀects in Table 9. Finally, in
Table 10, we present beneﬁt–cost ratios.
(a) Matching results
Table 2 presents PSM and IPWRA estimation results for the
following outcome indicators: (i) maize yield; (ii) income from
maize production; (iii) per-capita food expenditure; (iv) per-
capita non-food expenditure; (v) per-capita total expenditure;
and (vi) poverty headcount ratio. 8 We base our interpretation
based on IPWRA results as they are more robust than PSM.
We ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of partic-
ipation in the GES program on all productivity and welfare
outcome indicators. The results show that participation in
the GES program increased maize yields and maize income
by 22% and 26% respectively. In terms of welfare outcomes,
we found positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on con-
sumption and a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
poverty headcount ratio. In particular, the probability of
being poor declined by 24% points as a result of the GES pro-ics by GES registration
a
)
Registered to the GES
(N = 812)
Not registered to the GES
(N = 1,107)
Mean diﬀ
2,205 1,860 345***
88,216 69,669 45,935***
145,213 87,874 57,339***
66,310 44,779 21,531***
78,092 43,095 35,807***
7.9 7.3 0.6***
0.94 0.92 0.02
0.84 0.838 0.002
0.91 0.89 0.01
49.1 45.97 3.1***
0.096 0.111 0.015
0.36 0.25 0.11***
0.90 0.86 0.04***
4.64 4.34 0.30*
0.73 0.62 0.11***
0.24 0.15 0.09***
0.094 0.067 0.027**
0.045 0.029 0.016*
0.15 0.07 0.08***
0.225 0.103 0.12***
0.23 0.12 0.11***
0.70 0.52 0.18***
0.82 0.68 0.12***
48.3 31.9 16.4***
0.53 0.44 0.9***
iture, yield, and other controls.
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Figure 1. Distribution of propensity scores and common support region.
Table 2. Impacts of GES participation on outcomes of interest using PSM
and IPWRA estimation
Treatment variable = 1 if household is
registered for GES
PSM IPWRA
Maize yield 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.053) (0.046)
Income from maize production 0.32*** 0.259***
(0.071) (0.07)
Food expenditure 0.52*** 0.60***
(0.062) (0.040)
Total expenditure 0.401*** 0.46***
(0.061) (0.043)
Non-food expenditure 0.48*** 0.496***
(0.08) (0.061)
Poverty headcount ratio 0.21*** 0.24***
(0.031) (0.025)
N 1,919 1,919
Robust standard errors in bracket, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
6 WORLD DEVELOPMENTgram. However, these results have to be interpreted with cau-
tion and in fact they may be biased since we did not control for
unobserved heterogeneity.
The reliability of the PSM and IPWRA results depends on
the quality of our matching. We therefore provide some details
on the overall covariate balancing and common support.
Table 3 presents the overall covariate balancing test before
and after matching. The results reveal that the standardized
mean diﬀerence for all covariates used in the PSM is reduced
from 19.6% pre-matching to 3.7% post-matching. This result
shows that matching reduces bias by about 81%. In addition,
we rejected the joint signiﬁcance of covariates post-matching
(p-value = 0.543) while the joint signiﬁcance of covariates
was not rejected before matching (p-value = 0.0000). More-
over, due to matching, the pseudo-R2 declined from 15.2%
to 1.1%.
The high total bias reduction, the insigniﬁcant p-values of the
likelihood ratio test after matching, low pseudo-R2, and signif-
icant reduction in the mean standardized bias are indicative of
successful balancing of the distribution of covariates between
participants and non-participants of the GES. The common
support region is presented in Figure 1. A visual inspection
of the distribution of the estimated propensity scores indicates
that the common support condition is satisﬁed as there is sub-
stantial overlap in the distribution of the propensity scores of
both participants and non-participants of the GES.
(b) IV estimation results
(i) Determinants of participation in the GES: Sequential probit
model
As mentioned in the methodology section, we used a
sequential probit model to examine the determinants of par-
ticipation in the GES due to the sequential steps involved in
the GES program. In our setting, ﬁrst we estimate the deter-
minants of awareness to the GES. We then estimate the
determinants of registration to the GES conditional on
awareness. Finally, we estimate the determinants of receivingTable 3. Propensity score matching quality test.
Pseudo R2 LR X2 p-Value Mean bias
Before matching 0.152 397.28 0.0000 19.6
After matching 0.011 22.6 0.543 3.7
Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
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step as registration is a strict subset of awareness. Similarly,
receiving a mobile alert is a strict subset of registration. We
did not include the decision to collect allocated quantities of
fertilizer and improved seed in our sequential probit model as
it is not a strict subset of receiving a mobile alert. 9 Since the
selection bias occurs at the awareness and registration stage,
we assume that our instrument and farmer characteristics
aﬀects awareness and registration decision but not the prob-
ability of receiving a mobile alert conditional on awareness
and registration. 10
Results of the sequential probit model presented in Table 4
indicate that the excluded IV (Number of years of residence in
the village) aﬀects the probability of becoming aware of the
GES and the conditional probability of registration to the
GES conditional on awareness but not the conditional proba-
bility of receiving a mobile alert given registration in the GES
(Table 4). This shows that the selection bias has been remedied
by the instrument at the level of awareness and registration.
Looking into the determinants of participation at the diﬀerent
stages of the GES, we found that some farmer characteristics
such as access to climate information, access to varietal infor-
mation, social capital variables, and education aﬀect only
awareness about the GES but not the probability of registra-
tion conditional on awareness and the probability of receiving
mobile alerts conditional on registration. Similarly, access to
oﬀ-farm income and quality of housing, a proxy for wealth,
aﬀects awareness about the GES as well as the probability
of registration conditional on awareness positively.
This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Ricker-Gilbert
et al. (2011) and Chibwana et al. (2012) in Malawi. In addi-
tion, neither farmer characteristics nor the number of years
the household head has resided in the village aﬀect the proba-
bility of receiving mobile alerts conditional on registration to
the GES. We added goodness of ﬁt measure such as (Wald
chi2, Pseudo R2, percentage of correct prediction, and good-
ness of ﬁt measure based on McIntosh and Dorfman (1992))
at the bottom of Table 4. All the goodness of ﬁt measures sug-
gest a very high ﬁt for our probit model.
(ii) Eﬀects on productivity and maize income
The result showing the eﬀects of the GES program on maize
yields and maize income is presented in Table 5. Estimates of
‘‘No control” present a parsimonious speciﬁcation for maizeWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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Table 4. Estimates of sequential probit model
Variable GES
awareness
GES
registration
Received
mobile alert
Mobile phone
ownership
0.101 0.035 0.177
(0.134) (0.173) (0.308)
Household size 0.005 0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Education 0.284*** 0.175 0.233
(0.089) (0.136) (0.174)
Marital status 0.356** 0.372* 0.252
(0.157) (0.225) (0.352)
Age of the
household head
0.026** 0.009 0.043
(0.012) (0.024) (0.035)
Gender of the
household head
0.228 0.477** 0.115
(0.140) (0.210) (0.287)
Access to oﬀ-farm 0.203*** 0.221** 0.019
(0.069) (0.093) (0.134)
Rooﬁng material of
the house
0.283*** 0.485*** 0.442
(0.104) (0.165) (0.476)
Stress shock 0.083 0.144 0.176
(0.098) (0.100) (0.125)
Drought shock 0.125 0.363*** 0.071
(0.087) (0.113) (0.131)
Membership to
credit and saving
groups
0.176 0.134 0.104
(0.129) (0.171) (0.211)
Membership to
cooperatives
0.319** 0.396 0.243
(0.149) (0.262) (0.171)
Membership to
farmer research
group
0.040 0.021 0.153
(0.067) (0.108) (0.114)
Risk aversion 0.109 0.189* 0.086
(0.089) (0.107) (0.294)
Access to electricity 0.065 0.114 0.038
(0.090) (0.086) (0.132)
Access to varietal
information
0.174* 0.070 0.155
(0.092) (0.147) (0.171)
Access to climate
information
0.491*** 0.139 0.135
(0.071) (0.089) (0.172)
Number of years of
residence in the
village
0.026*** 0.041*** 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2(27) 334.1*** 332.5*** 61.4***
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.32 0.05
Goodness of ﬁt
measure (McIntosh
and Dorfman (1992)
1.34 1.54 0.87
Percentage correct
predictions
0.705 0.79 0.87
N 1,919 1,256 615
Standard errors clustered at enumeration area level are reported in
parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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(registration for the GES) along with state-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
Estimates of ‘‘With control”, present results where standardPlease cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2controls for maize yield and income are included. Estimates
of ‘‘With IV” present the results of the IV speciﬁcation in
which participation in the GES program is treated as endoge-
nous. We specify a log-linear functional form for maize yield
and income from maize production is estimated at levels.
The results presented in Table 5 show that participation in
the GES program has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on maize yields and income. Looking into our parsimo-
nious model speciﬁcation for maize yield, we found that the
eﬀect of the GES is similar in terms of the magnitude and
direction of estimated impacts in all speciﬁcations. In particu-
lar, farmers who participated in the GES increased their maize
yields by 28.1% when we controlled only for state-level ﬁxed
eﬀects, 26.1% when we included standard controls in addition
to state-level ﬁxed eﬀects and by 26.3% when we controlled for
the potential endogeneity of participation in the GES. Simi-
larly, estimated results in Table 5 suggest an increase of maize
income by ₦1.59 to ₦2.53. Note that, values for maize income
are expressed in ₦10,000. For instance, the eﬀect size ₦1.59
implies that GES participation increases income from maize
production by ₦15,900.
In our subsequent discussion, we base all our interpreta-
tions based on our preferred speciﬁcation (IV speciﬁcations).
The results in Table 5 show that as a result of GES, maize
yield has increased by 26.3%. Similarly, maize income of
GES participants has increased by ₦19,730. These results
suggest that the GES program enabled farmers to improve
their productivity and maize income. In Table 5, we also
included interaction terms to test if participation in the
GES has heterogeneous impacts. In particular, we introduced
an interaction term between participation in the GES and the
gender of the household head as well as between participation
in the GES and farm land size. We created a dummy variable
called ‘‘land category” which takes on a value of one if a
household owns less than 3 hectares of farm land and zero
otherwise. 11 The results show that the interaction term
between the GES and the gender of the household head is
insigniﬁcant for both maize yield and maize income. These
results suggest that GES beneﬁtted female-headed households
(FHHs) as much as male-headed households (MHHs). Simi-
larly, the interaction term between the GES and land cate-
gory is insigniﬁcant.
(iii) Eﬀects on welfare outcome indicators
This section presents and discusses the welfare eﬀects of the
GES program. We used per-capita total expenditure, food
expenditure as well as poverty headcount ratio as indicator
for welfare. In our estimation, total expenditure and food
expenditure are measured on per capita basis and estimated
using a log-linear functional form. Results are reported in
Table 6 Results. 12 Like the previous section, we did parsimo-
nious speciﬁcations in which we estimated eﬀects without stan-
dard controls, with standard controls, and with IV. Our
discussion is based on IV results. Our main result shows that
the GES program has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on per-capita total expenditure and food expenditure.
In addition to the direction of the estimated impacts, the eﬀect
size suggests a large improvement in welfare outcomes as a
result of participation in the GES program.
On average, per-capita total expenditure increased by
30.7%. Similarly, as a result of participation in the GES pro-
gram, per-capita food consumption expenditure increased by
39.4%. These results are consistent with previous studies in
Nigeria. For instance, Awotide, Karimov, Diagne, and
Nakelse (2013) found that certiﬁed improved rice seed voucher
system, which entitles beneﬁciaries to up to 20 kg of seed atWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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Table 5. Eﬀect of the GES on maize yield and maize income
Maize yield Maize income
No control With control With IV No control With control With IV
GES 0.281*** 0.261*** 0.263** 1.59*** 2.530*** 1.973*
(0.04) (0.060) (0.118) (0.41) (0.838) (1.161)
Gender 0.221* 0.346** 0.617 1.969*
(0.122) (0.147) (1.429) (1.10)
Land category 0.035 0.043 0.651 -3.060***
(0.073) (0.094) (0.820) (0.701)
GES*Gender 0.025 0.372 0.883 -3.566
(0.120) (0.254) (2.085) (2.347)
GES * land category 0.081 0.103 -1.117 0.802
(0.082) (0.139) (1.293) (1.234)
Household size 0.003 0.003 1.293*** 0.137***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.420) (0.043)
Education 0.035 0.030 0.620 1.437***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.564) (0.433)
Marital status 0.042 0.021 0.158 1.781**
(0.106) (0.110) (0.257) (0.750)
Age 0.014 0.012 1.988*** 0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.461) (0.061)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001)
Access to oﬀ-farm 0.005 0.005 1.833 0.504
(0.047) (0.047) (1.171) (0.376)
Rooﬁng material of the house 0.210*** 0.208*** 1.952 0.063
(0.066) (0.067) (1.281) (0.746)
Stress shock 0.118** 0.116** 0.001 1.928***
(0.055) (0.057) (0.001) (0.520)
Member to credit and saving groups 0.044 0.044 0.445 0.090
(0.061) (0.061) (0.835) (0.779)
Member to labor-sharing groups 0.167* 0.168* 0.267 1.275
(0.089) (0.089) (0.961) (1.378)
Member to cooperatives 0.198** 0.187** 1.855** 0.229
(0.077) (0.077) (0.869) (0.937)
Member to farmer research group 0.046 0.045 -1.183 0.304
(0.042) (0.042) (0.720) (0.411)
Risk aversion 0.023 0.022 0.577 1.329**
(0.053) (0.053) (1.254) (0.565)
Access to electricity 0.010 0.012 6.023*** 0.177
(0.043) (0.044) (1.782) (0.394)
Access to varietal information 0.035 0.031 -1.198 1.339**
(0.063) (0.061) (1.271) (0.556)
Access to climate information 0.013 0.011 0.750 0.703
(0.052) (0.051) (0.597) (0.471)
Joint signiﬁcance of all regressors (F-test) 15.9*** 5.7*** 4.86*** 7.21*** 9.68*** 8.85***
R2 0.055 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.11
Observations 1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919
State ﬁxed eﬀects but not reported here. Standard errors clustered at enumeration area level are reported in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Note: maize yield is estimated in log.
8 WORLD DEVELOPMENTsubsidized price, increased annual household income and per
capita consumption expenditure per annum and subsequently
contributed to overall poverty reduction by about 24% points.
Similar to our previous speciﬁcation, we also included an
interaction term between the GES and gender as well as farm
land size and found insigniﬁcant eﬀects for both per-capita
total expenditure and food expenditure.
The ﬁnal welfare indicator, headcount poverty ratio, is a
binary variable and hence the eﬀect size can be estimated using
a probit model speciﬁcation. However, the parameter esti-
mates for GES will only represent changes in the probability
of poverty instead of actual poverty reduction rates. Estimat-
ing the eﬀect of GES on poverty reduction instead of changesPlease cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2in the probability of poverty reduction requires examining the
distribution of observed poverty of GES participants and the
distribution of the counterfactual poverty of GES participants
had they not participated in the GES program. In other
words, we need to examine the poverty reduction eﬀects of
the 30.7% per-capita total expenditure growth reported in
Table 6 above and examine whether such changes are of suﬃ-
cient magnitude to lift poor farmers above the poverty line.
We therefore, calculated changes in the headcount poverty
ratio of GES participants as a result of the 30.7% increase in
per-capita consumption expenditure. Our result suggests that
as a result of GES, headcount poverty ratio has declined by
17.7% points.Welfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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In this section we present robustness cheeks for alternative
measures of participation in the GES program.
(i) Measuring treatment based on mobile alerts
In our main analysis, we measure participation in the GES
by registration status. Our data show that only registered
farmers have received mobile alerts. However, of the registered
farmers, only 76% have received mobile alerts. As a robustness
check, we deﬁne treatment based on receiving a mobile alert.
In particular, we created a dummy variable which takes a
value of one if the household has received a mobile alert and
zero otherwise.Table 6. Eﬀect of the GES on food a
Per-capita total ex
No control With cont
GES 0.51*** 0.396**
(0.046) (0.081)
Gender 0.246*
(0.122)
Land category 0.097
(0.078)
GES*Gender 0.011
(0.140)
GES*land category 0.118
(0.129)
Education 0.162**
(0.066)
Marital status 0.307
(0.157)
Age 0.004
(0.014)
Age squared 0.000
(0.000)
Access to oﬀ-farm 0.069
(0.051)
Rooﬁng material of the house 0.059
(0.084)
Stress shock 0.329**
(0.052)
Member to credit and saving groups 0.015
(0.067)
Member to labor-sharing groups 0.002
(0.109)
Member to cooperatives 0.085
(0.091)
Member to farmer research group 0.060
(0.052)
Risk aversion 0.290**
(0.090)
Access to electricity 0.140**
(0.046)
Access to varietal information 0.132**
(0.058)
Access to climate information 0.122*
(0.065)
Joint signiﬁcance of all regressors (F-test) 72.5*** 27***
R2 0.21 0.27
Observations 1,919 1,919
State-level ﬁxed eﬀects included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at e
*p < 0.1. Note: Per-capita food expenditure and total expenditure are measur
Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2Results are reported in Table 7 above. Parameter estimates
for maize yield and per-capita total expenditure are consistent
with our main ﬁndings in the results section of the paper.
(ii)Measuring treatment based on actual collection of subsidized
inputs
Our second robustness check is based on actual collection of
subsidized fertilizer and improved seed by farmers. Our data
show that only registered farmers have managed to collect
subsidized fertilizer and improved seed. However, only 69%
of the registered farmers have collected subsidized fertilizer
and improved seed. Similarly, 3.7% of the registered farmers
have managed to collect subsidized fertilizer and improved
seed without receiving a mobile alert. The second case maynd total consumption expenditure
penditure Per-capita food expenditure
rols With IV No control With controls With IV
* 0.307** 0.64*** 0.556*** 0.394**
(0.143) (0.05) (0.091) (0.191)
* 0.328** 0.224* 0.363**
(0.161) (0.126) (0.168)
0.168 0.063 0.159
(0.114) (0.079) (0.124)
0.252 0.052 0.451
(0.288) (0.141) (0.299)
0.266 0.058 0.261
(0.214) (0.133) (0.234)
0.161** 0.066 0.063
(0.067) (0.065) (0.066)
* 0.293* 0.185 0.160
(0.159) (0.157) (0.164)
0.005 0.011 0.012
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.075 0.015 0.025
(0.051) (0.048) (0.048)
0.053 0.069 0.056
(0.081) (0.077) (0.079)
* 0.330*** 0.371*** 0.374***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.058)
0.012 0.018 0.022
(0.074) (0.065) (0.073)
0.002 0.041 0.047
(0.103) (0.126) (0.117)
0.078 0.086 0.084
(0.098) (0.089) (0.101)
0.058 0.039 0.036
(0.055) (0.046) (0.049)
* 0.297*** 0.234** 0.245**
(0.097) (0.111) (0.122)
* 0.140*** 0.160*** 0.162***
(0.046) (0.050) (0.049)
0.135** 0.096* 0.103*
(0.059) (0.055) (0.057)
0.125* 0.090 0.099
(0.071) (0.063) (0.073)
22.7*** 61.52*** 23.31*** 16.15***
0.24 0.19 0.24 0.19
1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919
numeration area level are reported in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
ed in per capita and transformed in logarithmic scale.
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10 WORLD DEVELOPMENTarise due to network coverage or mobile phone ownership
issues. The program clearly stated that when the use of mobile
phone is not tenable, farmers can claim beneﬁts using scratch
cards or GES identiﬁcation cards. As such the second group of
the beneﬁciaries may have collected their share of fertilizer and
improved seed through scratch cards or GES identiﬁcation
cards. However, the ﬁrst group of households may have failed
to collect their share due to liquidity constraint as farmers are
expected to pay the subsidized price to private agro-dealers or
the redemption centers may have been far away which makes
the ﬁnal price expensive due to high transaction costs.
Nonetheless, these two issues will introduce measurementTable 7. . Results based on
Maize yiel
No control With cont
GES 0.237*** 0.219**
(0.04) (0.058)
Gender 0.241*
(0.121)
Land category 0.028
(0.064)
GES*Gender 0.096
(0.122)
GES*land category 0.099
(0.079)
Education 0.025
(0.051)
Marital status 0.035
(0.106)
Age 0.015
(0.015)
Age squared 0.000
(0.000)
Access to oﬀ-farm 0.017
(0.046)
Rooﬁng material of the house 0.223**
(0.067)
Stress shock 0.127**
(0.053)
Member to credit and saving groups 0.044
(0.060)
Member to labor-sharing groups 0.155
(0.088)
Member to cooperatives 0.204**
(0.078)
Member to farmer research group 0.047
(0.042)
Risk aversion 0.019
(0.053)
Access to electricity 0.009
(0.044)
Access to varietal information 0.035
(0.061)
Access to climate information 0.020
(0.052)
Joint signiﬁcance of all regressors (F-test) 12.66*** 5.24***
81.26***
26.42***
23.3***
R2 0.05 0.07
Observations 1,919 1,919
State-level ﬁxed eﬀects included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at e
*p < 0.1. Note: Per-capita total expenditure is measured in per capita and tra
Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2errors. Herein, we probe the robustness of our results by mea-
suring treatment by a dummy variable which takes on a value
of one if the household has collected subsidized inputs and
zero otherwise as a measure of program participation. We
focus on maize yield and poverty outcomes. Results are
reported in Table 8. Parameter estimates for maize yield and
per-capita total expenditure are consistent with our previous
ﬁndings.
(iii) Placebo eﬀects
Herein, we focus on registration without receiving a mobile
alert or collecting subsidized fertilizer and improved seedsreceiving mobile alerts
d Per-capita total expenditure
rols With IV No control With controls With IV
* 0.194** 0.54*** 0.413*** 0.349***
(0.085) (0.048) (0.071) (0.087)
* 0.324** 0.262** 0.318**
(0.138) (0.116) (0.140)
0.022 0.104 0.121
(0.070) (0.067) (0.074)
0.375* 0.049 0.246
(0.223) (0.151) (0.265)
0.074 0.131 0.195
(0.108) (0.122) (0.148)
0.021 0.131** 0.132*
(0.051) (0.066) (0.067)
0.020 0.297* 0.287*
(0.108) (0.155) (0.155)
0.013 0.003 0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.017 0.089* 0.092*
(0.046) (0.049) (0.050)
* 0.223*** 0.052 0.044
(0.067) (0.086) (0.082)
0.126** 0.346*** 0.346***
(0.055) (0.052) (0.054)
0.041 0.009 0.008
(0.061) (0.069) (0.074)
* 0.153* 0.013 0.018
(0.088) (0.109) (0.105)
* 0.198** 0.091 0.084
(0.077) (0.093) (0.094)
0.044 0.059 0.057
(0.042) (0.051) (0.054)
0.016 0.291*** 0.297***
(0.052) (0.088) (0.093)
0.012 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
0.034 0.122** 0.126**
(0.061) (0.057) (0.057)
0.020 0.126** 0.128**
(0.051) (0.063) (0.065)
4.85***
0.07 0.21 0.27 0.244
1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919
numeration area level are reported in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
nsformed in logarithmic scale.
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our reported results (Tables 5–8) are robust. In particular,
our dependent variable takes a value of one if the household
is registered for the GES but never received a mobile alert
or collected fertilizer and improved seeds and zero otherwise.
We used this result as a placebo test because registration with-
out collecting subsidized fertilizer and improved seeds
shouldn’t aﬀect productivity and welfare outcome indicators.
A positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect here implies the presence of
spurious correlation and hence our reported impacts (from
Tables 5–8) cannot be attributed as casual eﬀects of the GES
program. We focus on maize yield and income from maize
production. We opt to use income from maize productionTable 8. Results based on actual
Maize yiel
No control With con
GES 0.223*** 0.235**
(0.04) (0.054)
Gender 0.213
(0.118)
Land category 0.041
(0.060)
GES*Gender 0.000
(0.116)
GES*land category 0.145
(0.078)
Education 0.025
(0.051)
Marital status 0.037
(0.105)
Age 0.015
(0.015)
Age squared 0.000
(0.000)
Access to oﬀ-farm 0.016
(0.046)
Rooﬁng material of the house 0.233**
(0.067)
Stress shock 0.125**
(0.053)
Member to credit and saving groups 0.054
(0.061)
Member to labor-sharing groups 0.155
(0.087)
Member to cooperatives 0.223**
(0.078)
Member to farmer research group 0.053
(0.042)
Risk aversion 0.021
(0.054)
Access to electricity 0.007
(0.045)
Access to varietal information 0.035
(0.061)
Access to climate information 0.024
(0.054)
Joint signiﬁcance of all regressors (F-test) 10.9*** 5.24***
79.41***
26.56***
23.45***
R2 0.04 0.07
Observations 1,919 1,919
State-level ﬁxed eﬀects included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at e
*p < 0.1. Note: Per-capita total expenditure is measured in per capita and tra
Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2instead of poverty since we based our beneﬁt–cost calculation
on GES’s estimated eﬀects on maize income. Results are
reported in Table 9. In our placebo test, we did not ﬁnd any
positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the GES on maize
yield, maize income, and per-capita total expenditure. This
serves as a robustness check for the reported causal impacts
of the GES program.
(iv) Is the program cost eﬀective?
Herein, we provide beneﬁt–cost ratios albeit without
considering indirect beneﬁts and costs. For the purpose of
calculating the eﬀectiveness of the program, we collected data
on the quantity of seed and fertilizer allocated to farmers ascollection of subsidized inputs
d Per-capita total expenditure
trol With IV No control With control With IV
* 0.237** 0.54*** 0.426*** 0.424***
(0.103) (0.026) (0.070) (0.104)
* 0.317** 0.260** 0.330**
(0.141) (0.114) (0.142)
0.029 0.080 0.130*
(0.073) (0.061) (0.078)
0.411 0.077 0.356
(0.273) (0.133) (0.325)
* 0.103 0.096 0.251
(0.131) (0.111) (0.177)
0.002 0.127* 0.114*
(0.007) (0.067) (0.068)
0.016 0.281* 0.262*
(0.052) (0.155) (0.158)
0.009 0.004 0.006
(0.109) (0.014) (0.014)
0.012 0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.090* 0.089*
(0.000) (0.049) (0.050)
* 0.016 0.033 0.034
(0.046) (0.090) (0.082)
0.078* 0.341*** 0.338***
(0.045) (0.052) (0.054)
0.013 0.023 0.022
(0.068) (0.070) (0.074)
* 0.049 0.012 0.015
(0.061) (0.105) (0.105)
* 0.156* 0.121 0.105
(0.088) (0.096) (0.094)
0.211*** 0.072 0.072
(0.077) (0.052) (0.054)
0.052 0.287*** 0.289***
(0.043) (0.083) (0.093)
0.020 0.140*** 0.134***
(0.053) (0.045) (0.046)
0.011 0.119** 0.110*
(0.044) (0.055) (0.057)
0.028 0.134** 0.128**
(0.061) (0.067) (0.065)
4.8***
0.07 0.21 0.27 0.24
1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919
numeration area level are reported in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
nsformed in logarithmic scale.
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Table 9. Placebo eﬀects
Maize yield Maize income Per-capita total expenditure
With IV With IV
GES 0.384 0.135 4.500***
(0.366) (0.431) (0.722)
Gender 0.258** 0.079 0.237
(0.117) (0.097) (0.164)
Land category 0.016 0.338*** 0.143*
(0.066) (0.056) (0.082)
GES*Gender 0.655 0.040 0.270
(1.102) (0.881) (1.411)
GES*land category 0.216 0.198 0.752
(0.460) (0.421) (0.610)
Education 0.014 0.131** 0.094
(0.057) (0.053) (0.090)
Marital status 0.034 0.226*** 0.204
(0.106) (0.069) (0.157)
Age 0.017 0.001 0.010
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Access to oﬀ-farm 0.041 0.025 0.285***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.056)
Rooﬁng material of the house 0.259*** 0.032 0.156*
(0.068) (0.062) (0.082)
Stress shock 0.146** 0.204*** 0.508***
(0.060) (0.064) (0.060)
Drought shock 0.040 0.057 0.055
(0.069) (0.044) (0.081)
Member to credit and saving groups 0.050 0.009 0.210**
(0.060) (0.078) (0.097)
Member to labor-sharing groups 0.136 0.133 0.304***
(0.090) (0.150) (0.106)
Member to cooperatives 0.255*** 0.000 0.092
(0.080) (0.097) (0.056)
Member to farmer research group 0.051 0.037 0.302***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.079)
Risk aversion 0.010 0.133*** 0.132***
(0.053) (0.049) (0.045)
Access to electricity 0.003 0.030 0.057
(0.047) (0.038) (0.057)
Access to varietal information 0.046 0.144** 0.218***
(0.065) (0.057) (0.069)
Access to climate information 0.047 0.095** 4.500***
(0.055) (0.042) (0.722)
Joint signiﬁcance of all regressors (F-test) 4.50*** 8.64*** 25.92***
R2 0.064 0.10 0.264
Observations 1,919 1,919 1,919
State-level ﬁxed eﬀects included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at enumeration area level are reported in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
Table 10. Cost beneﬁt analysis of the GES
Beneﬁt Cost Beneﬁt–cost ratio 95% CI
Income gain per household 19,727 –
Total cost per household (subsidy & admin costs) 17,826
Beneﬁt–cost ratio 1.11 0.17 to 2.38
12 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwell as the ﬁnal quantity collected and the price paid by farm-
ers. We calculated the cost of subsidy per kg of fertilizer and
improved seed as the diﬀerence between the market price
and the subsidized price of fertilizer and improved seeds. How-
ever, data on registration, administrative, and logistic costs of
the GES program are not available despite our best eﬀorts to
obtain it. Since costs for registration, transportation, storage,Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2procurement, and administration are likely to be signiﬁcant;
we took some of the cost components of the Malawi input
subsidy program from Chirwa and Dorward (2013) to provide
a proxy for what the costs of Nigeria’s subsidy program could
be. 13
Table 10 provides beneﬁt–cost ratios of the GES, valued at
market prices and without accounting for economy-wideWelfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
017.04.021
PRODUCTIVITY AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF NIGERIA’S E-VOUCHER-BASED INPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAM 13eﬀects. With the gains in maize income as a measure of eco-
nomic beneﬁts, the beneﬁt–cost ratio of the program is esti-
mated at 1.11. This means that each dollar the government
spends on input subsidy generates US$1.11 worth of maize
income. Further, the 95% conﬁdence interval suggests that
the BCR for all participants of the GES lies between 0.17
and 2.38.
It is worth noting, however, that our calculation is based on
the so called ‘‘production-based” approach and ignores indi-
rect beneﬁts (Arndt, Pauw, & Thurlow, 2015). Using the same
production-based approach, Dorward and Chirwa (2011)
reported an average beneﬁt–cost ratio of 1.06 for Malawi,
whereas Arndt et al. (2015) accounted for economy-wide
eﬀects and reported a higher beneﬁt–cost ratio of about 1.62
for the same program. Arndt et al. (2015) showed that ignor-
ing economy-wide eﬀects can be consequential for large-scale
subsidy programs such as the GES. However, these eﬀects
stand in contrast to some results from Nigeria, where Take-
shima and Liverpool-Tasie (2013) reported that the previous
Nigerian input subsidy program has little to no eﬀects on
maize prices.5. CONCLUSIONS
In Nigeria, improving agricultural productivity through the
use of fertilizer and improved seeds is imperative to improve
food security and reduce the pervasive nature of rural poverty.
However, the use of such key agricultural inputs is rather low
even by SSA standard as a result of pervasive input and credit
market imperfections. With the premise of improving the use
of improved seed and inorganic fertilizer, the government of
Nigeria embarked on a mobile phone-based input subsidy pro-
gram in 2012. Using a unique household-level data from rural
Nigeria, this paper examined the productivity and welfare
eﬀects of the GES program. In particular, the study provides
insights into how eﬀective the program was in enhancing pro-
ductivity and improving welfare outcomes. The study
employed instrumental variable regression approach to con-
trol for the potential endogeneity of participation in the
GES program.Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2Our main empirical ﬁndings are as follows. First, farmers
who participated in the GES increased their maize yield by
26.3%. Similarly, maize income of GES participants
increased by ₦19,730. These results suggest that the GES
enabled farmers to improve their productivity and income
from maize production, which is a case for justifying the
intervention. Second, in terms of the welfare outcomes, the
GES has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
per-capita total, food, and non-food consumption expendi-
tures. The size of the estimated eﬀects suggests a large
improvement in welfare as a result of participation in the
GES program. Speciﬁcally, GES participants increased their
per-capita total consumption expenditure by 30.7%. As a
result of this consumption growth, poverty headcount ratio
has declined by 17.7% points among participants of the
GES. Third, the eﬀect of the interaction term between partic-
ipation in the GES and farm land size as well as GES and
gender is insigniﬁcant suggesting the absence of heterogeneity
eﬀects based on gender and farm land size. Fourth, the ben-
eﬁt–cost ratio of the program, valued at market prices and
without accounting for economy-wide eﬀects, is about 1.11.
Each unit of dollar that the government spends as a subsidy
yields a return of 1.11 dollars.
The results presented in this paper should be interpreted
with caution. First, our identiﬁcation strategy relies on
cross-sectional data which limits the generalizability of the
results beyond one agricultural production year. The use
of panel data and ﬁxed-eﬀects would be an important
extension in the future. Second, our beneﬁt–cost ratio cal-
culation does not take into account indirect beneﬁts and
costs. Moreover, in estimating impacts on productivity
and welfare, we did not consider the possibility of farmers
re-selling their fertilizer and improved seeds due to lack of
data. Although the GES strictly prohibits re-selling of the
received inputs, we cannot rule out the possibility of some
recipients selling fertilizer and improved seeds in the local
market or at the redemption centers. When subsidized
inputs are re-sold at the local market, it will deﬁnitely
introduce a crowding-out eﬀect. Examining the crowding-
out eﬀect of the program will therefore be an important
extension.NOTES1. To date, many studies have examined the eﬀect of input subsidies in the
context of SSA. The most obvious examples include Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne
et al., 2013; Jayne et al., 2013; Holden & Lunduka, 2013; Chirwa &
Dorward, 2013 forMalawi. Lunduka et al., 2012;Mason&Ricker-Gilbert,
2013; Mason & Jayne, 2013 for Zambia, Liverpool-Tasie, 2013 for Nigeria.
Arguments against subsidies are based on economic ineﬃciencies and
welfare losses as a result ofmarket distortions while arguments for subsidies
are largely based on credit and input market imperfections (Holden &
Lunduka, 2013; Jayne et al., 2013; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne et al., 2013)
2. Usually, a smart subsidy is deﬁned based on the eﬃciency of targeting.
In particular, smart refers to subsidies that work to create demand for
commercial fertilizer and seed as opposed to those that have a crowding-
out eﬀect. The ‘‘smartness” of GES is mostly based on its innovativeness
in terms of using mobile-based e-vouchers.
3. However, the absolute magnitude of the subsidy was small given that
the government of Nigeria generally allocated less than 3 percent of its
budget to agriculture (Takeshima et al., 2013).4. One may argue that the variable ‘‘the number of years the
household head has resided in the village” could potentially aﬀect
welfare and productivity outcomes. However, our falsiﬁcation test in
the appendix (Table 11), suggests no casual eﬀect of the variable ‘‘the
number of years the household head has resided in the village” on
welfare and productivity outcomes, providing evidence that it is a
‘‘plausibly exogenous” IV.
5. Note that, maize income refers to income generated from sales of
maize. It could be that some farmers may have lower maize income when
harvest is used for own consumption. This is accounted in our food
expenditure and total expenditure measures as imputed value of own
consumption is included.
6. Oﬃcial exchange at the time of data collection is (1 USD = 200₦).
However, it must be noted that rates are higher than 300₦ in parallel
markets.
7. This value is based on World Banks $1.25 per day per capita.Welfare Eﬀects of Nigeria’s e-Voucher-Based Input Subsidy Pro-
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14 WORLD DEVELOPMENT8. Note that all outcome variables except poverty headcount ratio are
expressed in logarithmic scale.
9. In principle, collection is a strict subset of receiving a mobile alert.
However, some registered farmers didn’t receive alerts due to network
coverage issues, loss of mobile phones, and errors while registering mobile
numbers. See our robustness checks in Section 4(d).
10. If farmer characteristics—including years-in-village—determine noti-
ﬁcation (conditional on registration) then it would strongly suggest that
receiving a mobile alert is not exogenous to farmers’ action. We thank an
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.211. Note that we used 3 ha as the median land size in our data is about
3 ha. Moreover, GA (2014) suggested that most eligible farmers are these
with a land size of less than 3 ha.
12. Non-food expenditure are presented in the appendix (Table 12).
13. A detail cost structure of the Malawi program is presented by Chirwa
and Dorward (2013) on page 122, Table A5.1. Still, not all the cost
components of the GES are accounted for due to the lack of cost data
from the government. Detail cost components used for the calculation of
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Variables Yield
Number of years of residence in the village 3.51
(2.2)
N 1,919
Table 12. Eﬀects on no
No contr
GES 0.61***
(0.08)
Gender
Land category
GES*Gender
GES*land category
Education
Marital status
Age
Age squared
Access to oﬀ-farm
Rooﬁng material of the house
Stress shock
Member to credit and saving groups
Member to labor-sharing groups
Member to cooperatives
Member to farmer research group
Risk aversion
Access to electricity
Access to varietal information
Access to climate information
Joint signiﬁcance of all regressors (F-test) 90.75***
R2 0.204
Observations 1,919
State-level ﬁxed eﬀects included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at e
*p < 0.1.
Please cite this article in press as: Wossen, T. et al. Productivity and
gram, World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2for our instrument
Maize income Per-capita total expenditure
180.8 41.7
(119.6) (204)
1,919 1,919
n-food expenditure
Per-capita non-food expenditure
ol Without IV With IV
0.474*** 0.460***
(0.081) (0.152)
0.166 0.072
(0.130) (0.183)
0.156** 0.235*
(0.077) (0.123)
0.200 0.388
(0.232) (0.384)
0.157 0.317
(0.132) (0.223)
0.198** 0.235***
(0.091) (0.091)
0.356** 0.375**
(0.178) (0.181)
0.003 0.003
(0.014) (0.016)
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
0.162** 0.136**
(0.066) (0.069)
0.082 0.098
(0.116) (0.113)
0.355*** 0.334***
(0.066) (0.069)
0.068 0.071
(0.093) (0.098)
0.019 0.002
(0.111) (0.110)
0.107 0.089
(0.131) (0.133)
0.063 0.065
(0.075) (0.078)
0.366*** 0.364***
(0.091) (0.097)
0.168*** 0.174***
(0.060) (0.061)
0.206*** 0.214***
(0.078) (0.081)
0.233*** 0.222***
(0.074) (0.083)
27.97*** 26.1***
0.26 0.245
1,919 1,919
numeration area level are reported in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,ScienceDirect
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